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Writing secure web applications is a complex task. 
In fact, a vast majority of web applications are likely to 
have security vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
using simple tools like a common web browser. This 
represents a great danger as the attacks may have 
disastrous consequences to organizations, harming 
their assets and reputation. To mitigate these 
vulnerabilities, security code inspections and 
penetration tests must be conducted by well-trained 
teams during the development of the application. 
However, effective code inspections and testing takes 
time and cost a lot of money, even before any business 
revenue. Furthermore, software quality assurance 
teams typically lack the knowledge required to 
effectively detect security problems. In this paper we 
propose an approach to quickly and effectively train 
security assurance teams in the context of web 
application development. The approach combines a 
novel Vulnerability Injection Technique with relevant 
guidance information about the most common security 
vulnerabilities to provide a realistic training scenario. 
Our experimental results show that a short training 
period is sufficient to clearly improve the ability of 
security assurance teams to detect vulnerabilities 




A large number of web application developers do 
not have the required software engineering skills and 
competences to build secure code. The consequences 
can be disastrous as there is a wide collection of 
vulnerabilities affecting many web sites that can be 
maliciously explored. Aggressive time to market 
constraints and reduced cost policies push companies 
to release their software as soon as possible, 
disregarding, in many cases, the quality assurance 
procedures needed to identify and mitigate potential 
code vulnerabilities.  
To reduce the number of security vulnerabilities, 
web applications must undergo quality assurance 
procedures, including  Code Inspections (the 
application is analyzed from the point of view the 
programmer) and Penetration Testing (the application 
is tested from the point of view of the users/attackers) 
[1]. Although these procedures are mandatory for 
companies that want to be compliant with security 
standards like the Payment Card Industry [2], that is 
not the case for the vast majority of web applications in 
the field. Furthermore, as quality assurance teams 
frequently lack the knowledge required to detect 
security problems, they tend to focus only on typical 
software bugs, leaving many security vulnerabilities 
undetected, which may not only have a devastating 
cost to the company but also to their clients. 
In this paper we propose a methodology to train 
security assurance teams to perform effective code 
inspection and manual penetration testing in web 
applications. Our approach uses the injection of 
realistic vulnerabilities in web application files that are 
going to be used during training activities. This 
provides to security teams an experience close to what 
they will find when inspecting or testing web 
applications to detect real vulnerabilities. The 
vulnerabilities injected are realistic as they are defined 
based on the results of a field study on real security 
vulnerabilities [3]. With this data we built a 
Vulnerability Injection Tool that automates the 
injection process.  
In our proposed methodology, a security assurance 
team should start by attending a short generic training 
course on security in web applications followed by a 
practical exercise in which the team tries to find 
vulnerabilities in software code. Afterwards, the team 
attends another short training course, this time focusing 
on providing the team relevant information on the most 
common vulnerabilities found in web applications. As 
a final step the team performs a second practical 
exercise on security code inspection and penetration 
testing (obviously, the team is expected to perform 
better during this exercise as a result of the knowledge 
they acquired during the second training course). The 
code used during the practical exercises is generated by 
automatically injecting vulnerabilities in the source 
files of web applications using the Vulnerability 
Injection Tool.  
We have tested our approach in laboratory to assess 
its effectiveness. Two different teams attended the 
training sessions and results show that both teams 
increased their ability to detect vulnerabilities. To have 
a more detailed view on the performance of the teams, 
we also executed some penetration tests using 
commercial vulnerability application scanners. 
Amazingly, both security teams outperformed the 
vulnerability scanners by detecting more 
vulnerabilities.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
presents the proposed approach. Section 3 explains 
how the vulnerability information is used by the 
Vulnerability Injection Tool and during the training 
sessions. Section 4 presents the experiments performed 
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper 
and suggests future work. 
 
2. Methodology for Training Security 
Assurance Teams 
 
Security concerns must be present during all the 
phases of the software development lifecycle and 
security cannot be seen just as a minor issue. In fact, it 
must be a design goal [4] and this is represented well in 
Microsoft's [5] and McGraw's [6] software 
development lifecycles. Security vulnerabilities must 
be mitigated during the development lifecycle before 
the software is released. Code Inspection and 
Penetration Testing represent two key quality 
assurance procedures that must be used to detect 
security vulnerabilities. Code inspection is a white-box 
approach that consists in the formal review of the 
application code by an external team. Penetration 
testing is a black-box approach consisting in a set of 
tests made from the point of view of the users, where 
the external team tries to find all the possible 
vulnerable entry points of the application. Penetration 
testing can be performed manually or it can be done 
using automated tools, although even top commercial 
products have a high rate of false positive (non 
vulnerabilities that are tagged as vulnerabilities) and 
false negative (vulnerabilities that are not identified) 
values [7].  
Searching for security vulnerabilities is different 
from searching for generic software bugs. When 
searching for bugs the objective is to see if the code is 
compliant with the functional specification of the 
application. It is common to forget to analyze the 
consequences of unspecified situations and usually this 
leads to undetected security problems. Searching for 
security vulnerabilities, on the other hand, is aimed at 
probing for dangerous hidden functionalities that are 
somehow present in the code and that can be 
maliciously exploited.  
The methodology proposed in this paper is aimed at 
the training of the security assurance teams for code 
inspection and penetration testing and consists of four 
key steps: 
1. Basic training. The team attends a short generic 
training course about vulnerabilities in web 
applications and how to detect them using both source 
code inspection and penetration testing. In this session 
no detailed information is given about the profile of 
typical security vulnerabilities. 
2. First test. The second step is a practical training 
session to consolidate what was learned and to get a 
baseline measure of the performance of the team 
(concerning vulnerabilities identification) before being 
specifically trained for security vulnerabilities 
identification (the next step). To create a lifelike 
scenario, a set of realistic vulnerabilities are injected in 
the web application files that are going to be used. 
These vulnerabilities are based on the most common 
vulnerabilities found in web applications and the 
injection can be done using the Vulnerability Injection 
Tool proposed in the present paper (see 3.3 for details). 
3. Specific training. The team attends another short 
training course. This course focuses on the specific 
attributes of the most common vulnerabilities found in 
web applications, like where they may be located and 
what code is usually responsible for them (see 3.1 for 
details). It also provides guidance on how to exploit 
these vulnerabilities based on the specific 
characteristics of the vulnerabilities (see 3.2 for 
details). 
4. Second test. At the end there is a second 
practical training session to consolidate all that was 
learned. The setup is similar to the one used in the first 
practical training session. The number of 
vulnerabilities detected by the security team and the 
time needed to detect them are important metrics that 
are used to evaluate if the team’s ability to identify 
security vulnerabilities improved when compared to 
the first practical session. These metrics are collected 
and analyzed separately for each type of quality 
assurance procedure (code inspection and penetration 
testing). 
Searching for vulnerabilities of every type in web 
application code is time consuming and requires high 
expertise on the huge variety of code patterns that 
represent vulnerabilities. It is much simpler and 
cheaper to search only for the most common 
vulnerability types, if they can cover almost all the 
situations.  If we can quickly and easily mitigate this 
type of vulnerabilities, we are cleaning the most 
important security problem in web applications. 
 
3. Vulnerability Data and Vulnerability 
Injection Tool 
 
In order to focus on the most common types of 
vulnerabilities affecting web applications we use the 
results from a field study that classified 655 security 
patches of six widely used LAMP (Linux, Apache, 
MySQL and PHP) web applications [3]. This field 
study focuses on Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL 
Injection vulnerabilities. Note that these are two key 
vulnerabilities that, together, were responsible for 
approximately 1/3 of all the Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures in 2006 [8].  
The fault types that resulted from the field study [3] 
are depicted in Table 1, along with their distribution. 
As we can see, the MFC extended fault type is the 
most common, accounting for most of the 
vulnerabilities found. It represents vulnerabilities that 
are caused by a variable that was not properly sanitized 
and that should have been cleaned by a specific 
function (which the programmer did not include in the 
code). 
This way, to build a realistic vulnerability injector 
for web applications we do not need the specific 
characteristics of each one of the 12 fault types of 
Table 1. In fact, because the MFC extended fault type 
is responsible for 76% of all the security problems 
analyzed and the next fault type is as low as 7%, the 
MFC extended is the obvious candidate to be used in a 
first approach to build a tool for vulnerability injection. 
The MFC extended is typically observed in 
situations where the missing function is related to 
filtering or changing the content of one of its 
arguments. The target argument is a variable whose 
value comes from a GET or POST HTTP parameters 
or from database results. 
The nature of the function that the programmer 
failed to include in the source code causing the MFC 
extended vulnerability is determinant for this fault type 
analysis. This is why in [3] this fault type was divided 
into the sub-types A, B and C, accounting for 45.34%, 
18.32% and 12.21% of all the vulnerabilities, 
respectively: 
A - Missing casting to numeric of one variable. 
The missing function converts a PHP variable to 
numeric type. This can be accomplished with the 
“(int)” type cast or the “intval” PHP function. 
Although the “(int)” type cast is not really a function, it 
is present in this sub-type because it behaves just like 
the “intval” function. 
B - Missing assignment of one variable to a 
custom made function. To cope with specific needs of 
cleaning PHP variables from code injection, the 
software programmer may have to write its own 
filtering functions. This fault type refers to the 
situations where the programmer forgets to use one of 
these specific functions with some critical variable. 
C - Missing assignment of one variable to a PHP 
predefined function. The missing function is one of 
the PHP predefined functions that can be used to filter 
variables from code injection. According to the field 
study presented in [3], the most frequent PHP 
predefined functions related to this vulnerability type 
are the following: “addslashes”, “eregi_replace”, 
“stripslashes”, “htmlentities”, “preg_replace”, 
“htmlspecialchars”, “md5”, “str_replace”, “urlencode”. 
 
3.1. The MFC extended Vulnerability 
Operators 
 
The Vulnerability Injection Tool uses information 
about the Location Pattern and Vulnerability Code 
Change of each vulnerability type in order to inject 
vulnerabilities in the source code of web applications. 
These attributes are the building data for the 
Vulnerability Operator and they define how to inject 
the fault type in the web application source code. They 
Table 1. The vulnerability fault types observed in the field and their relevance [3] 
Fault type Description Vulnerabilities (%) 
MFC extended Missing function call extended 75.88 
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call 7.02 
MIFS Missing if construct plus statements 5.19 
WVAV Wrong value assigned to variable 4.27 
WFCS Wrong function called with same parameters 2.75 
MVIV Missing variable initialization using a value 1.37 
MLAC Missing "AND EXPR" in expression used as branch condition 1.37 
EFC Extraneous function call 0.92 
MFC Missing function call 0.61 
MIA Missing if construct around statements 0.31 
MLOC Missing "OR EXPR" in expression used as branch condition 0.15 
ELOC Extraneous "OR EXPR" in expression used as branch condition 0.15 
are also used during the second training course 
provided to the teams. 
In spite of the valuable information provided by the 
field study presented in [3], the results are not enough 
to completely define the Vulnerability Operators. We 
need additional data targeting on the location patterns 
and on the code fixes of the vulnerabilities. To obtain 
these attributes we conducted another field study in 
which we analyzed the same raw data of the 655 code 
fixes from the 6 web applications used by [3], focusing 
on how to mimic the vulnerabilities found in the code. 
Due to space restrictions, only the information related 
to the MFC extended fault type is described in this 
paper: 
Location Pattern: 
To inject MFC Extended vulnerabilities we need to 
locate functions having the following characteristics: 
- The function must be one of the functions defined 
in the sub-types A, B or C (the functions targeted 
depend on the sub-type being injected); 
- The argument of the function is directly or 
indirectly related to an input value from the outside: 
POST, GET, the return of an SQL query; 
- The output of the function is going to be displayed 
on the screen or is going to be used in a POST, a GET 
variable or is going to be used in a SQL query string; 
- The function can be an argument of another 
function or have another function as the argument; 
- In the argument of the function, the vulnerable 
variable may also be present inside a $_GET, 
$HTTP_GET_VARS, $_POST, $HTTP_POST_VARS  
PHP variable arrays; 
- For the MFC extended sub-types B and C the 
vulnerable variable may be one of the PHP variables, 
like the $_SERVER['PHP_SELF']. 
Vulnerability Code Change: 
After finding the potential locations for the 
vulnerability injection we need to perform the code 
change. Depending on the code surrounding the 
function, one (and only one) of the following changes 
is applied in the case of MFC Extended vulnerabilities: 
1. If the function is used in an assignment as the 
only line of code and the variable is not inside a 
$_GET, $HTTP_GET_VARS, $_POST, 
$HTTP_POST_VARS PHP variable array the whole 
line of code is removed. For example remove the line 
“$vuln_var = intval($vuln_var);”; 
2. If the function is used in an assignment as the 
only line of code and the variable is inside a $_GET, 
$HTTP_GET_VARS, $_POST, $HTTP_POST_VARS 
PHP variable array only the function is removed from 
the code, leaving the argument intact. For example to 
replace “$vuln_var = 
intval($_GET[‘vuln_var’]);” with “$vuln_var 
= $_GET[‘vuln_var’];”; 
3. In the other cases only the function is removed 
leaving in the code only the variable, or the $_GET, 
$HTTP_GET_VARS, $_POST, $HTTP_POST_VARS 
PHP variable array if the variable is inside. For 
example to replace 
“…“’str1’.intval($vuln_var).’str2’”;” with 
“…“’str1’.$vuln_var.’str2’”;”. 
An important aspect is that the injection of these 
code changes does not prevent the application from 
running. In fact, the web application code continues to 
run without any syntactic or execution errors (except 
for the vulnerability injected). 
 
3.2. Code exploit 
 
The Vulnerability Operators also provide some 
insights that can help a code inspection or penetration 
test team to find and exploit the vulnerabilities 
emulated. Looking at the MFC extended Vulnerability 
Operator we can see that integer variables are a major 
target. They are derived from the sub-type A and 
responsible for 45.34% of all the vulnerabilities found. 
During code inspection the security team should verify 
thoroughly if all the variables that should store integer 
values cannot contain a non integer value (assigned, 
displayed, etc.). During penetration testing these 
variables with integer values should be a primary target 
to attack. This can be accomplished by appending a 
text to them, for example: 
- “ or 1=1” or “ or ’a’=’a’”, etc. when 
searching for SQL Injection; 
- “<script>alert(’XSS’)</script>” when 
searching for XSS; 
- Fuzzing with ’, ”, >, <, ), (, etc. at the begin 
and/or end of the variable text. 
Sub-types B and C have more functions to target 
than sub-type A, so the information that can be derived 
from them is more generic. During code inspection the 
security team should search for variables that are not 
sanitized using PHP functions (sub-type C) or 
functions developed specifically for the application 
(sub-type B). The possible use of the non-sanitized 
PHP variables, like the “$_SERVER[’PHP_SELF’]” 
should also be tested. In this case, the test is typically 
done by attaching a XSS exploit at the end of the script 
name and path in the URL. For example, the link: 




It is important to emphasize that this code exploit 
type of information is presented to teams during the 
second training session in our methodology. An 
explanation of the typical approaches to fuzz for SQL 
Injection [9] and XSS [10, 11] is done in the first 
training session. 
 
3.3. The Vulnerability Injector Tool 
 
We implemented a Vulnerability Injector Tool 
based on the Location Pattern and Vulnerability Code 
Change attributes of the Vulnerability Operator. 
Currently it only supports the three MFC Extended 
sub-types, but others can be easily configured. To use 
this tool we must start by specifying the path to a PHP 
file of a web application. After, the procedure for 
injecting software faults consists of two stages, which 
are executed automatically by the tool: 
1. The code of the target web application is 
examined in order to identify all the points where each 
type of fault can be injected, resulting in a list of 
possible fault locations and vulnerability types. When 
the list of potential locations is extensive, because the 
application code is large, resulting in lots of possible 
locations for each fault type, the relative percentages 
shown in Table 1 are used to select locations. 
2. Each fault is injected, which corresponds to the 
insertion of the Vulnerability Code Change (defined by 
the Vulnerability Operator) in the web application file. 
The result of this process is a set of delta files 
containing the vulnerability locations found. The delta 
files consist of only the modified portion of the PHP 
code with its location, making it easier for a person to 
analyze and store it. The delta files may be applied to 
the original file (injecting the vulnerabilities) by using 
the Unix “patch” command, that is also available for 
other Operating Systems. 
 
4. Experiments with Code Inspection and 
Penetration Testing 
 
In this section we describe the training experiments 
and discuss the results. The experiments focus on both 
Code Inspection and Penetration testing and the key 
objective is to verify if the training based on the 
knowledge of the most common vulnerabilities 
improves the detection skills of the security assurance 
teams. The other objective is to confirm the usefulness 
of the Vulnerability Injection Tool in providing web 
application files with vulnerabilities suitable for 
training the teams.  
The Code Inspection test consists of the execution 
of a formal code inspection procedure targeting a block 
of source code of a web application. This block of code 
was previously injected with vulnerabilities using the 
Vulnerability Injector Tool. In this formal code 
inspection procedure each member of the team has its 
own role, as in traditional code inspections [12]: a 
Moderator, a Reader, a Note Taker and the others are 
Inspectors. The Author of the code is also present to 
clarify any doubts about the web application. 
The Penetration testing consists of interacting with 
the web page of the application from the point of view 
of the attacker. The test team searches for 
vulnerabilities by trying to penetrate the application 
tweaking the POST and GET HTTP parameters, 
although they do not know the source code being 
executed. The web page under attack was previously 
injected with vulnerabilities using the Vulnerability 
Injector Tool. During the Penetration Testing the data 
in the database may change as a result of the natural 
fuzzing process to find vulnerabilities. This is usually 
the case when searching for SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities, because the tester is tweaking the SQL 
queries sent to the database. To restore the database to 
its initial state we built the Vulnerability Injector 
Remote Control Application. This application 
communicates with a service deployed in the database 
server computer. This service is listening in a specific 
port and is able to restore the database when requested 
by the control application. 
Both code inspection and penetration testing teams 
follow the experimental procedure presented in Section 
2. The following points present some information on 
the instantiation of the procedure for these concrete 
experiments: 
1. Basic training. It is a thirty minute generic 
training on XSS and SQL Injection. This training is 
based on data from the Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP) [13]. In this training session we 
describe the vulnerabilities, what causes them (the 
deficient validation of external input) and the dangers 
involved. Then, we explain the generic ways to search 
for them using the source code of the web application 
and using the browser by looking for the display and 
for the HTML generated. One real life example of 
exploiting each type of vulnerabilities is also detailed. 
2. First test. The security team executes the first set 
of code inspection and penetration tests. 
3. Specific training. It is also a thirty minute 
training on XSS and SQL Injection, but this time 
focusing on the results of the field study [3], on the 
Vulnerability Operators (Location Pattern and 
Vulnerability Code Change) and Code Exploit that are 
described in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
4. Second test. The security team executes a second 
set of code inspection and penetration tests. These tests 
target a block of code different from the one used in 
step 2. 
For the experiments we used the MyReferences 
custom made web application. It consists of 13 PHP 
files and it runs in a Linux Box with the Apache Web 
Server accessing a MySQL database. This application 
is used to manage publications: it allows the storage of 
PDF documents, and some information about them like 
the title, the conference, the year of publication, the 
document type, the relevance, and the authors. The 
database used comprises five tables and has currently 
stored 118 publications from 317 authors.  
For the experiments we used two security teams of 
six elements each. One of the teams (team T1) 
incorporated experienced people with several years of 
software development, including a technical manager, 
a quality assurance officer, and a project manager. The 
other team (team T2) was composed of computer 
science university students without much programming 
experience. In what concerns the vulnerabilities tested, 
some of them have some incipient knowledge about 
SQL Injection but they all have very little or none 
about XSS. 
The people involved in our experiments can be 
considered as non security experts, as none of them 
had ever been part of a security test team, although 
they have some insights of the technologies involved. 
As the main goal of the experiments is to evaluate the 
learning curve provided by our approach of training 
people using vulnerability injection scenarios, the low 
level of expertise on security coding was not a 
problem. Unfortunately, the reality is that many web 
application projects actually use programmers without 
specific know how on secure coding, just like the two 
teams used in our experiments. In this sense, the results 
of the experiments also represent what can be achieved 
in training mainstream web programmers. 
Four days before the start of the experiments we 
provided the teams a document detailing the web 
application files and the entity-relationship diagram of 
the database. Furthermore they had access via a web 
browser to the web application and they knew the login 
credentials of a registered user of the web application. 
 
4.1. Code Inspection Experiments 
 
For the code inspection tests we used the following 
two files of the web application: 
- edit_paper.php. Allows the update, delete insert 
and visualization of the information of to each paper; 
- show_papers.php. Shows the information about a 
list of papers that can be sorted by any field. Each page 
only shows five papers at a time and it is possible to 
filter the papers using some restrictions. 
We picked two different blocks of code from the 
edit_paper.php and injected 4 vulnerabilities in each. 
The number of vulnerabilities injected respected some 
rules: must be the same number in each block; it must 
allow the team to be able to get results even if they 
missed some vulnerabilities; it must be a reasonable 
number for the total of lines of code considered (in this 
case approximately 100 lines of code). The same 
procedure was done to the show_papers.php but we 
were able to inject 5 vulnerabilities in each one. In 
order to expose similar code in both periods, one block 
from each file was used during the Basic Training 
period and the others during the Specific Training 
period. 
The results of the Basic Training Period of code 
inspection done by the two teams (T1 and T2) are 
depicted in Table 2. We can observe the number of 
vulnerabilities injected in the files, the number of 
vulnerabilities discovered and the average time spent 
analyzing each line of code. The results of the Specific 
Training Period are depicted in Table 3. 
Comparing the results obtained before and after the 
Specific Training we can see a clear improvement in 
the number of vulnerabilities discovered by the code 
inspection security teams. In the first training period 
both teams discovered 5 vulnerabilities and left 4 
undetected. After the Specific Training, they could find 
all the 9 vulnerabilities injected. An interesting aspect 
is that both teams were able to find more vulnerable 
locations than those that were expected. These are 
represented with a (+nº) in Table 3. This enforces the 
idea that we can never know when we have all the 
vulnerabilities mitigated, although it is important to 
address the most that we can, thus reducing the attack 
surface. An important aspect is that, although the 
security teams were much more effective in the second 
training period, they spent nearly the same amount of 
time inspecting each line of code than before. 
Table 2 – Code Inspection results of the basic training period 
Web Application File Code Lines 
# vulnerabilities #Seconds/Line of code Injected Discovered 
T1 T2 T1 T2 
edit_paper.php 1-104 4 3 2 18 51 
show_papers.php 36-184 5 2 3 16 30 
 Total 9 5 5 17 33 
The teams also made some mistakes in these 
experiments. During the Basic Training period team T1 
reported a variable as being vulnerable in the 
show_papers.php. Although this variable is not 
sanitized in the code, all the possible values that it may 
have belong to a set of hard coded values, making it 
impossible to be exploited by an attacker. During the 
Specific Training period team T1 also detected the use 
of the same variable responsible for the previous 
mistake in the same PHP file in three other locations. 
As expected, they signaled these as possible locations 
to be exploited. This mistake was clearly propagated 
from the previous code inspection phase. Both teams 
indicated another variable as being vulnerable to attack 
(in the edit_paper.php file), but again that variable 
could only take values hard wired in the code. It is a 
good practice to sanitize every input variable, and all 
mistakes that were found in the two phases are fine 
recommendations for the programmers. Although they 
are not currently a threat, a future upgrade of the web 
application can change some parts of the source code 
exposing these unprotected variables to the attacker. 
 
4.2. Penetration Test Experiments 
 
For the Penetration Test Experiments we have used 
as target the file edit_authors.php. This file is 
responsible for the update, delete insert and 
visualization of the information related to the authors 
of each paper. We created two modified versions of 
this file, one to be used during the Basic Training 
period and another to be used during the Specific 
Training period. In each of the modified versions we 
injected 5 vulnerabilities guaranteeing that those 
injected in one version were different than those 
injected in the other version. Once again, the 
vulnerabilities used were provided by the Vulnerability 
Injection Tool.  
We restricted the search time to 60 minutes for each 
training period of penetration testing, because this time 
should be enough for the teams to find most of the 
vulnerabilities injected without dwindling the team’s 
detection efficiency. The chosen target application file 
used only GET HTTP parameters, preventing the 
unnecessary need for more time to perform the tests, as 
if it had POST HTTP parameters the teams had to use 
something like a proxy (e.g. Paros Proxy [14]) to be 
able to intercept the communication between the 
browser and the Internet. After having intercepted the 
communication, it is as easy to manipulate POST as 
GET parameters. 
We also wanted to know if the vulnerabilities 
injected in the edit_authors.php could be detected by 
some top commercial web application vulnerability 
scanners and compare the results with those of the 
security teams. These scanners provide an automatic 
way to search for vulnerabilities avoiding the repetitive 
and tedious task of doing hundreds or even thousands 
of tests by hand for each vulnerability type. We used 
the HP WebInspect 7.7 [15] and the IBM Watchfire 
AppScan 7.0 [16] scanners and we randomly named 
them S1 and S2. We have decided to keep the brand of 
the web vulnerability scanners anonymous to assure 
neutrality and because commercial licenses do not 
allow in general the publication of tool evaluation 
results. 
The results of the penetration test experiments done 
to the modified versions of the edit_authors.php file are 
depicted in Table 4. It includes the data obtained by the 
two teams (T1 and T2) from both before and after the 
Specific Training Period. There are also represented 
the results of the scanners (S1 and S2) when they 
searched for vulnerabilities in the same web pages used 
by the teams. 
 
4.3. Overall Results and Discussion 
 
Summing up the results of the Code Inspection 
Experiments and the Penetration Testing Experiments 
we observed a clear improvement after the Specific 
Training (Figure 1). Although the small number of 
samples we can see that there was an increase in 
Table 3 – Code Inspection results of the specific training period 
Web Application File Code Lines 
# vulnerabilities #Seconds/Line of code Injected Discovered 
T1 T2 T1 T2 
edit_paper.php 105-215 4 4 4 23 24 
show_papers.php 185-283 5 5 (+4) 5 (+1) 13 28 
 Total 9 9 (+4) 9 (+1) 18 25 
Note: Unexpected vulnerabilities that were discovered are represented by a (+nº) 
 
Table 4 – Penetration Test results  
 # vulnerabilities 
Injected Discovered and Exploited 
T1 T2 S1 S2 
Basic Training Period 5 1 2 1 0 
Specific Training Period 5 4 3 1 2 
vulnerability detection of around 40% in both the code 
inspection and the penetration tests. We can also 
confirm that the security teams did better than the 
commercial scanners even before the Specific Training 
period. These improvements in vulnerability detection 
are impressive given the short period of time used to 




In this paper we present a methodology for the 
training of security assurance teams using vulnerability 
injection. This methodology is based on the most 
common vulnerabilities found in field study of web 
applications allowing us to build a Vulnerability 
Injection Tool (to inject realistic vulnerabilities during 
the training) and to provide important guidance 
information to the trainees. The experimental results 
show an improvement in the number of vulnerabilities 
found by security teams whether executing code 
inspection or manual penetration testing. The teams 
even outperformed top commercial vulnerability 
scanners in the penetration testing approach. The 
results emphasize the two main ideas of our approach: 
1. The data associated to the most common 
vulnerability types can be used with success as a guide 
to train security teams, improving the results of both 
the code inspection and penetration security tests; 
2. The importance of a flexible tool like the 
Vulnerability Injection Tool to provide files with 
realistic vulnerabilities to train the security teams. 
For future work we intend to use this approach to 
evaluate security teams, to estimate the total number of 
vulnerabilities still present in the code and to build a 
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